In most published chaos-based communication schemes, the system's parameters used as a key could be intelligently estimated by a cracker based on the fact that information about the key is contained in the chaotic carrier. In this paper, we will show that the least significant digits (LSDs) of a signal from a chaotic system can be so highly random that the system can be used as a random number generator. Secure communication could be built between the synchronized generators nonetheless. The Lorenz system is used as an illustration.
Introduction
Chaos-based communication has been intensively studied in the past decade [Pecora & Carroll, 1990; Cuomo & Oppenheim, 1993; Sundar & Minai, 2000; Dachselt & Schwarx, 2001; Fraser et al., 2002] . This new communication technique has been expected to be secure since a chaotic carrier is wide-band, random-like, and sensitive to initial conditions. However, many researchers have shown that the security of the chaos-based communication is not so high [Kocarev, 2001] . In case the cracker does not have any information about the chaotic cryptosystem, he may extract the embedded message from the interrupted signal by building a return map [Pérez & Cerdeira, 1995] , or reconstructing an attractor [Short, 1994] , or using wavelets techniques [Huang et al., 2001] . The success of these cracking approaches relies on the intrinsically deterministic behavior of the carrier. More complicated carriers have been employed to mitigate this problem. Examples are impulsive systems [Stojanovski et al., 1996; Zhang et al., 2001] , randomly multiplexed chaotic systems [Sundar & Minai, 2000] , or continuous, deterministic but highly chaotic systems [Yao et al., 2002] . These systems are useful in increasing the difficulty of cracking if one uses the above mentioned cracking methods as nonlinear dynamical forecasting [Short, 1994] , but will lose their effectiveness if the cracker has the information about the cryptosystem, even without knowing the values of the system's specific parameters (i.e. its key). Why? Because in most proposed approaches the carrier contains information about the key. The cracker may extract the key by using the known information about the cryptosystem and some statistical techniques.
In Sec. 2, we introduce a simple cracking scheme to obtain information about the key. In Sec. 3, we show that least significant digits (LSDs) of a chaotic or nonlinear signal contain little information about the key. The LSDs then become candidates to carry messages securely.
A Cracking Scheme
In conventional cryptanalysis, statistical techniques are often used. Recently, combining statistics and adaptive control, Zhou and Lai [1999] introduced an interesting scheme to crack chaotic cryptosystems. The scheme has succeeded in finding the key of the parameter modulated Chua's and Lorenz systems. In this section, we use the similar idea to show the low security of a Lorenz cryptosystem.
To crack a transmitter system, described bẏ
let us consider the corresponding intruder system:
where α is a parameter vector, and ∆α the mismatch between the intruder and transmitter systems. Here we use the same function vector f since we assume that the cracker knows the form of the transmitter system. If ∂ n f /∂α n (n = 1, . . . , ∞) exists, namely, f is smooth at α up to C ∞ , then we havė
where ∆α · ∂/∂α = i ∆α i (∂/∂α i ) over all parameters.
The error dynamical system iṡ
At this stage, one may design a control approach by letting ∆α be some function g(e) so that system (4) is asymptotically stable at the equilibrium [Zhou & Lai, 1999; Li et al., 2002] . Of course, in practice, the cracker does not know the values of α. Instead, the cracker has to first guess the values of the parameters of the intruder system, α 0 , then establish a loop, α j+1 = α j + g(e) j , where · · · j means some averaged value of · · · during the jth interval. When the intruder system is synchronized with the transmitter system, one obtains the stable values of α j = α [Zhou & Lai, 1999] . For example, when the transmitter is the Lorenz systems [Lorenz, 1963] and the transmitted signal is s = y + m [Kocarev & Parlitz, 1995] , where m is the "plaintext" message, we havė β, but not α. The intruder system is theṅ
where k is the control coefficient and g(s, y in ) j = (1/T )
The cracker runs the intruder system from time t j to t j + T and records the difference of s(t) and y in (t), then updates α j to α j+1 . Repeating the process, finally he may obtain a stable α j . The form of g(s, y in ) can be any function of s − y in or |s| − |y in |. For systems (5) and (6), we find that g(s, y in ) = |s| − |y in | is very efficient. It is assumed that one has or can find a suitable g for a given system and parameters. Figure 1 (a) displays the process when g(s, y in ) = |s| − |y in |, and α 0 = 0 (in solid line) and 50 (in dashed line), respectively. To obtain the figure, we have taken k = 0.5, m = A cos(ωt), and T = 20π/ω. Here A is about 3% of the magnitude of y, and ω the averaged frequency of y. From Fig. 1(a) , it is seen that the intruder system converges to the transmitter system rapidly in a quite large region of α. More interestingly, there is an approximately linear relationship between |s| − |y in | and (α − α j ) as shown in Fig. 1(b) . If A = 0, α − α j will go to zero when j → ∞.
The intruder system works because the carrier y contains strong information of α, and |y| changes with α smoothly. Denote y(t; c) the output y(t) of the transmitter system when α = c. The behavior of |y(t; α)| − |y(t; α + ∆α)| may be very simple.
A similar result has also been obtained when x is chosen as the carrier. In this case, the global synchronized transmitter-receiver system can be designed asẋ
where s = x + m, while the intruder system iṡ
It has been shown that the parameter α j quickly converges to α, like that depicted in Fig. 1 . The results for this case are displayed in Fig. 2 .
Thus, if the communication is based on the synchronized transmitter-receiver system, a cracker may break the system by the technique described above. The approach is also suitable to automatically adjusting more parameters of the intruder system until the system is synchronized with the transmitter system. Actually, a similar idea has been successfully used to build theoretical models from experimental data [Sakaguchi, 2002] .
It is well known that the necessary condition for synchronization is that the Lyapunov exponents of the sub-system are negative [Pecora, 1990] . For the chaotic Lorenz system, if variable z is used as the carrier, it can be shown that the largest Lyapunov exponent of the (x, y) sub-system is positive [Pecora, 1990] . Therefore, we suppose that the transmitter-receiver and intruder systems would not use z as the carrier.
A Random Carrier
To improve the security of the chaos-based communication, therefore, we need to deeply hide information about the key in the carrier. A good example is the Baptista cryptosystem [Baptista, 1998] , in which the signal is not the variable of the transmitter but the iteration times of evolving the transmitter system from the current state to the next in a manner determined by the plaintext. Although it has been argued that the cryptosystem could be cracked by known-plaintext attacks [Jakimoski & Kocarev, 2001; Li et al., 2003] , the signal contains much less information about the key. The disadvantages of the cryptosystem are inefficiency and sensitivity to perturbations. For reasonable security in a 16-bit cryptosystem at least 250 and up to 65532 iterations are needed to encode a plaintext unit [Baptista, 1998] . If the signal is perturbed during transmission, all the following information will not be recovered correctly because the signal cannot synchronize with the receiver at all. Can we design a more efficient and secure cryptosystem? As we know, two neighboring chaotic orbits will separate from each other exponentially. This is equivalent to the information loss in the rate (λ/ln 2) bit/orbit, where λ is the largest positive Lyapunov exponents of the system. If y(t), the state of the system at t, is expressed in n bits for each system variable, after T = nT 0 ln 2/λ, where T 0 is the averaged period of the orbits, statistically all the information in y(t) is lost, namely, there is no correlation between y(t) and y(t + T ). In this sense the time series, {y(t + iT ), i ∈ I}, should behave as if it were random. One normally requires that the sampling time be shorter than T 0 for reconstruction. However, typically in this scenario T T 0 . Using this sort of series as a carrier is the basic idea of using impulsive or sporadic systems to improve the security of the communication. But if T T 0 , it is also impossible to reach the synchronization between the transmitter and receiver. On the other hand, if T is not so large, information of the key is still contained in the carrier. For example, the cracker may obtain some information of the key by calculating g(s, y in ) , or by observing the attractor in (x in , s, z in ) phase space if s = y + m. Clearly, the orbits cannot separate from each other suddenly, but gradually, and therefore the information of the orbits loses bit by bit from the lowest to the highest. The value of the least significant digits (LSDs) of a chaotic signal is much more sensitive to initial conditions and therefore more random-like. Here, the LSDs are the lowest digits in a number, located at the far right of a string. For instance, the three LSDs of the single precision variable, v = 0.12345678, are 6, 7 and 8, among which we call the digit 6 the most significant digit of the three LSDs. The value of the three LSDs of v is defined as 0.00000678. For simplicity, in this paper, we use LSDs to denote "the value of LSDs". For the Lorenz system, if we use the time series of y(t), we can reconstruct an attractor just like the Lorenz attractor projected on the (x, y) phase plane [see Fig. 3(a) ]. Now if we use the LSDs of y(t), denoted by y l (t, ε) ≡ |mod(y(t), ε)|, where mod is the modulus function, and ε = 10 k , k is an integer chosen so that ε is less than the magnitude of y(t), then the reconstructed attractor is no longer like the original but like a random one, especially when ε/∆t |ẏ(t)| (see later for details) as depicted in Figs the magnitude of y(t). In this case, the sensitivity property of the LSDs is employed indirectly. There are many approaches to measure complexity, for example the Kolmogorov entropy [Kolmogorov, 1965] , the Lyapunov exponents and the autocorrelation function [Mees et al., 1987] . One may also use some techniques used in measuring the quality of pseudo-random generators [L 'Ecuyer, 1988] . Here, we use forecast entropy [Yao et al., 2004] to check the property of y l (t, ε). Forecast entropy (F ) measures the predictability based on the observed time series. For the absolutely unpredictable ideal random system, F = 1. For any completely predictable systems, such as periodic systems, F = 0. For any real system such as a chaotic system or a pseudo-random system, F lies on the interval [0, 1]. To calculate F of an observed time series s(t), first, we reconstruct an attractor from s(t) by using delayed coordinates (s(t), s(t + τ ), . . . , s(t + (d − 1)τ ), where τ is the delay and d the embedding dimension. Properly choosing τ and d results in a simpler local structure of the attractor, and therefore an easier prediction based on the attractor. Second, for an arbitrary point, p, on the reconstructed attractor, we search its n = l m nearest neighboring points in the normal space. Here l and m are positive integers. l depends on how the observation is scaled. If we double the scale, then l = 2. Third, the predictability or complexity of the dynamical behavior in this local region centered at p depends on the distribution of these points in the tangent space. Therefore, to measure the complexity, we consider the distribution in the tangent space on different scales. Fourth, the forecast entropy of this neighborhood is given by
where non, 1948] of the distribution in the tangent space at the ith scale. The coefficient (1/l m−1 ln l) comes from the ideal random system, which has the same number of state points, so that F p is normalized, and the coefficient of S i stands for the weight of the contribution from the ith scale. Finally, letting p go over all the points on the attractor and taking the average of F p yields the F of the observed time series.
For the time series from the Lorenz system, we take d = 3. In Fig. 4 we compare F of y(t), y l (t, ε) when ε = 1, 10 −3 , 10 −5 , and a pseudo-random generator respectively. All these time series have 4096 data, and we take n = 16 and l = 2. The sampling rate for the Lorenz system is 0.01, and for the pseudo-random system the series is sampled continuously. The pseudo-random system is described by [Park & Miller, 1988 ]
where a = 7 5 = 16807, b = 2 31 − 1 = 2147483647, c = 0. b is modulus, which determines the maximal length of the pseudo-random number sequence. From Fig. 4(a) , it is seen that the minimal F of y(t) appears at τ = 0.07, which is the proper value of τ to reconstruct the Lorenz attractor in threedimensional space. (To best reconstruct the attractor in the two-dimensional plane, we have obtained τ = 0.09 from the F . For other methods to determine the delay, see, for example, [Fraser, 1989] .) From Fig. 4(b) , it is seen that (i) F of y l (t, ε) increases monotonically as ε decreases until ε < 10 −2 where F ≈ 0.57 is saturated, meaning that the time series of LSDs of the Lorenz system is not so random as that from the ideal random system; and (ii) after saturation, the F of y l (t, ε) has the same shape as that of the pseudo-random system, and has bigger values. (However, we do not conclude that the randomness of y l (t, ε) is better than that of sequence {I j } because sometimes different measurement techniques may give inconsistent results.
To show the randomness (complexity) of the above time series, it is necessary to measure them and to compare the results obtained using many different techniques such as the Kolmogorov entropy.) For convenience in comparison, we have set the stepsize of iteration of the pseudo-random system 0.01. Therefore, one can easily obtain a random sequence from a chaotic system. An interesting question here is: what is the source of this apparent randomness in the LSDs sequence? In the pseudo-random system (11) it is the incommensurate pair a and b that generates the long random-like sequence. In some nonlinear systems, the incommensurability also helps the systems produce chaotic signals. For instance, in the tent map
where x n ∈ [0, 1) and a is a parameter. For a = 1/2, the Lyapunov exponent λ = ln 2 > 0, and the map is expected to be chaotic. However, when the initial condition x 0 has a finite precision, the map will go to the unstable fixed point, 0. The proof is given below. Since x 0 ∈ [0, 1), we may let x 0 be expressed in binary form: 
Similarly, when n = 1, there are four possible values for x 2 depending on the value of x 1 .
Repeating the process, we obtain the possible values for x j , j ∈ [2, N − 1]. If N → ∞, namely, the precision of x 0 is infinite, we may never obtain a steady solution. When N is finite, or when we numerically simulate the tent map on a computer where x 0 is truncated to be M i=1 2 −i a i , then the tent map for a = 1/2 will finally go to 0. Here M is the length of mantissa of the computer. This ends the proof.
If at least one of 1/a and 1/(1 − a) has the value 
where
the range of k is not less than that of j. In other words, after the iteration, the precision of x 1 is not less than that of x 0 . Repeating the iteration, the map will not go to the unstable fixed point, 0. When a = 1/2, then i 0 = −1 and L = 1, the condition L + i 0 − 1 ≥ 0 is not satisfied, and the trajectory goes to the fixed point. If a is incommensurate with 1/2, we have L ≥ 2, then the condition holds and the trajectory would not go to the fixed point.
However, the incommensurability is not necessary for preventing the precision loss in the above discussion. Nonlinear functions can have similar property. For example, consider the logistic map, x n+1 = ax n (1 − x n ), for a = 4 = 2 2 when x 0 = 0.125 = 2 −3 . In this case, the Lyapunov exponent is positive, and the mapping is chaotic. With a similar analysis as that for the tent map, one can show that the nonlinear term in the logistic map, −4x 2 n , plays a similar role in preventing the precision loss.
The same conclusion may be obtained for the Lorenz system though the proof is not straightforward as that for the tent and logistic maps. As a matter of fact, the nonlinear terms in the Lorenz system play the essential role in the socalled Baker's transformation which may result in random-like orbits/data. The LSDs do nothing but display the randomness.
In floating-point computation, we should also consider whether the apparent randomness comes from the truncation error and/or round-off error. The truncation error is due to the numerical integration scheme, while the round-off error comes from the machine's limit of precision. As we have seen, the limit of precision can cause the numerical illusion for the tent map when a = 1/2. However, we have shown that the true reason of the illusion is the loss of precision, not the limit of precision. Very recently, it has been shown that the Lorenz attractor is not a numerical illusion (see [Steward, 2000] ). We will show in this paper that if the value of LSDs is larger than the "machine epsilon" -the smallest number that a specific computer can recognize as being bigger than zero when added to 1, the effect of the errors can be ignored.
Unlike the pseudo-random system (11), which works in integer set and uses incommensurate a and b to generate random-like series, the chaotic Lorenz system runs in real number set and utilizes the nonlinear terms. (It at least does not require the parameters or initial conditions being incommensurate.) The randomness of the LSDs obtained from the Lorenz system and {I} from the pseudo-random system could be different. A more detailed comparison of randomness between the pseudo-random number sequence and y l (t, ε) is in progress.
To utilize the property of randomness to improve the security of communication, for the Lorenz system (5), we design s = |mod(y(t), ε)/ε|+m. The carrier |mod(y(t), ε)/ε| ∈ [0, 1] if ε is less than the maximum of y(t). In this case, the magnitude of the plaintext message |m| 1 so that the message is masked well by the carrier.
With the form of s = |mod(y(t), ε)/ε| + m, the behavior of the Lorenz system (5) is more random due to the nonlinearity of the modulus function. To show the role of the modulus function in producing random-like series, for example, we consider the Hénon map (i.e. no truncation error in the algorithm):
where a and b are parameters. When a = 1.0, b = 0.25 for the initial condition x 0 = y 0 = 0.5, the map yields a period-4 orbit [see Fig. 4 (a)]; while for (a, b, x 0 , y 0 ) = (1.5, 0.25, 0.5, 0.5), the orbit is chaotic as shown in Fig. 5(b) . Note that the values of (a, b, x 0 , y 0 ) can be expressed exactly on a computer. Now if we modify the Hénon map as
and take ε = 0.125 = 2 −3 (i.e. no round-off error) and 0.1251 (i.e. round-off error existed) respectively, the original period-4 orbit becomes random-like, as shown in Figs. 6(a) and 6(b). When the original orbit is chaotic, the modified Hénon map produces even more random-like series, as depicted in Figs. 6(c) and 6(d). It is shown by comparing Fig. 6(a) with Fig. 6(b) , and Fig. 6(c) with Fig. 6(d) that the round-off error in ε = 0.1251 has little affect on the distribution of (x n , y n ) in the phase space. For the pseudo-random system (11), if the modulus function is not used, the system is linear and its dynamical behavior is simple. It is the modulus function that helps the system generate the randomness. Figure 6 suggests that when the original system (without the modulus function) is in chaos, the modulus function helps produce much more random results. It is not a novel idea to use random number sequences to improve the security of the communication. But the length of those random sequences is limited. Very recently, Fraser, Yu and Lookman used the LSDs of chaotic variables to encode the message too [Fraser et al., 2002 ], yet they used the impulsive signal y(t) not y l (t, ε) to synchronize the systems. Therefore, their cryptosystem does not offer much higher security than an impulsive cryptosystem does. Langford and Sladewski [2003] also independently studied the sensitivity of residues of a chaotic signal on the initial conditions. They used a modular arithmetic filter to produce a uniformly distributed carrier to improve the security of the communication.
The information loss of y(t) is very small between t and t + ∆t when ∆t 1. But the modulus function can speed the loss. For example, if y(t) = 0.1234567890, ε = 10 −5 , and we numerically integrate the transmitter system with stepsize ∆t = 0.01, then after two iterations, the information of y(t) may be lost completely.
For the Lorenz system (5), the corresponding receiver system iṡ
The transmitter-receiver system is globally synchronized for any form of s [Kocarev & Parlitz, 1995] . The message can then be unmasked perfectly at the receiver, m r = s − |mod(y r (t), ε)/ε|. For the cracker, however, the values of parameters are unknown. The cracker has to use the intercepted signal, s, and the intruder system (6), or other more delicately designed intruder systems, to estimate the values. But at this time, he will find it is extremely difficult because the carrier is just random when ε 1. To show this, first we let the intruder system bė
then investigate the mis-synchronization of the transmitter system (5) and the intruder system (18) [Dachselt & Schwarx, 2001 ]. Our numerical result shows that when ε 1, there is no simple relation between g(y, y in ) and ∆α except when ∆α → 0. g(y, y in ) randomly oscillates around 0. To observe it better, we display log 10 |g(y, y in )| versus ∆α in Fig. 7 . To be more convincing, we have used T = 2000π/ω so that g(y, y in ) is more stable. Therefore, no information about ∆α could be obtained by using this simple statistic technique except that the cracker estimates the key very well. It is noted that when ε > 10 −2 the magnitude of log 10 |g(y, y in )| decreases as ε does. This is because mod(y(t; α), ε)/ε and mod(y in (t; α + ∆α), ε)/ε are more uniformly distributed on [−1, 1] when ε decreases. When ε < 10 −2 , the magnitude keeps unchanged. This is in agreement with what we obtained in forecast entropy [see Fig. 4(b) ]. Clearly, if m = 0, it is more difficult to find the key.
The order of ε for y l (t, ε) to be random can be estimated. For y ∈ C ∞ , we may have
To obtain a random series from y(t), we perform the modulus function mod(ε) on Eq. (19). The correlation between mod(y(t + ∆t), ε) and mod(y(t), ε) is determined by mod(ẏ(t) ∆t, ε). If ε is greater than the maximum of |ẏ(t)|∆t, mod(ẏ(t)∆t, ε) = y(t)∆t which is deterministic. On the other hand, if ε < |ẏ(t)|∆t , mod(ẏ(t)∆t, ε) may be random. For the Lorenz system (5), where s = |mod(y(t), ε)/ε|, our numerical results have shown that when ∆t = 0.01, ε = 0.001, mod(ẏ(t)∆t, ε) is random. Our communication scheme is not secure if ∆t → 0, namely, the message, m, is encoded continuously, because we may not be able to find a finite value of ε. Fortunately, the communication is efficient enough when ∆t is finitely small. To extract α from g(s, y in ), ∆α should be very small. The order of ∆α can be estimated as follows. Because 
For the chaotic Lorenz system, M ∼ 1. Thus, the tolerance of the estimation error of the key should be no larger than ε as shown in Fig. 7 (d). (If there is a chaotic system in which M is very small, we can then use its output instead of the LSDs of the output as the carrier to achieve secure communication.) Similarly, we can estimate another order of ∆α so that only when ∆α is less than the order can the cracker recover the embedded message m. The recovered message by the cracker is
In order to obtain a good estimation of the message, m, |mod(e y (t), ε)/ε| < |m|. Because |m| 1, we have
Thus, if the transmitter system has N parameters used as the key, to estimate the key, the cracker needs to try up to V ε −N times, where V is the volume of the chaotic parameter region. For the Lorenz system, if we use σ, α and β as the key, and the system is in chaos when σ ∈ (5, 15), α ∈ (25, 35) and β ∈ (2, 3), and we take ε = 10 −10 , then V ε −N = 10 32 . It is almost impossible for the cracker to break the system. Of course, not all the parameters offers the same security. Figure 8 displays the synchrony of the Lorenz system when parameter σ or β in the transmitter and receiver systems is mismatched. When ε = 10 −10 , in order to reach the synchronization, the mismatch ∆σ should be less than 10 −9 , and ∆β should be less than 10 −10 . The cracker may further decrease the search time by using a more complicated technique. But it is not easy to find such techniques because the carrier can be quite random.
Finally, we consider the effect of noise. As discussed above, the round-off error can cause perturbations on the systems. The size of the round-off error is usually measured by the machine epsilon, ε m . We have used double precision in our numerical simulations and found ε m ≈ 10 −16 . Figure 9 displays the testing results when ε = 10 −14 , 10 −15 and 10 −16 , respectively. When ε > ε m , the system has similar dynamical behavior [see Figs. 9(a) and 9(c)]. When ε ≤ ε m , the system becomes more complicated [see Fig. 9(e) ] because the round-off error generates bigger perturbations in the simulations. However, the transmitter and receiver systems can still be synchronized even if ε ≤ ε m because of the global synchronization of the systems. Also, it is seen from Figs. 9(b), 9(d) and 9(f) that ε does not have much effect on the synchronization speed.
Another type of perturbation comes from the channel noise during the transformation. Such a perturbation can lead to mis-synchronization although the synchronization could be reached again after the perturbation disappears. To improve the robustness of the system against the channel noise, we increase the number of LSDs, namely, by taking not too small ε. For ε = 10 −3 we have numerically simulated the effect of the channel noise on the mis-synchronization, and found that when the magnitude of the noise (white) is 10 −2 , 10 −4 , 10 −6 , 10 −8 , the mis-synchronization |mod(y(t), ε)/ε| − |mod(y in (t), ε)/ε| is 0.3, 0.05, 0.02, 0.0001 respectively. Therefore, if the magnitude of the plaintext message is 0.3, the magnitude of the channel noise should be less than 10 −2 . However, the use of larger ε will cause lower security. To increase the robustness of our present communication scheme against the channel noise, we take only one or two of the most significant digits of the LSDs as the carrier. In this case, the plaintext should be expressed in binary for high quality transmission of message. At the receiver, the signal received contains the channel noise. If the noise is much weaker than the carrier and message, we can easily filter the noise by taking the same length of significant numbers of the signal. For example, if we take one efficient number as the carrier, when the noise is less than 0.1, it can be detected and filtered out.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed the carrier in chaos-based communication. It has been shown that the information of the key is contained in the carrier and could be detected by using some simple statistical techniques. A more complex carrier such as a complicated function of the variables of the transmitter system could not increase the difficulty of cracking dramatically. To hide the information more securely, it is shown that the LSDs of a chaotic signal should be much more random, and therefore can be used as the carrier. The sensitivity of the system to its parameter (key) has also been studied. Such a chaos-based communication may be more efficient and secure.
